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The Realist that investigates questions of ontology by appeal to the 
quantifi cational structure of language assumes that the semantics for 
the privileged language of ontology is externalist. I argue that such a 
language cannot be (some variant of) a natural language, as some Real-
ists propose. The fl exibility exhibited by natural language expressions 
noted by Chomsky and others cannot obviously be characterized by the 
rigid models available to the externalist. If natural languages are hostile 
to externalist treatments, then the meanings of natural language expres-
sions serve as poor guides for ontological investigation, insofar as their 
meanings will fail to determine the referents of their constituents. This 
undermines the Realist’s use of natural languages to settle disputes in 
metaphysics.
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externalism, internalism.
1. Introduction
Metaphysical investigation has, for the better part of the past century, 
been conducted by way of linguistic meaning. By tracing the mean-
ings of expressions to their worldly extensions, metaphysicians aim 
to determine a sentence’s ontological commitments by examining the 
purported worldly satisfi ers of its truth-conditions. As a consequence, 
metaphysicians embrace—either explicitly or not—a particular view 
about linguistic meaning in order to render their investigatory prac-
tices coherent. My task here is to undermine this assumed view about 
* My thanks to Erin Eaker, Steven Gross, J. Brendan Ritchie, and Alexander 
Williams for fruitful discussions about this project, and for comments on earlier 
drafts. I am also deeply indebted to Paul Pietroski for his repeated feedback on 
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2 C. A. Vogel, Lexical Flexibility, Natural Language, and Ontology
linguistic meaning, and thereby undermine the metaphysical method-
ology that assumes this troubled view about natural languages and 
their semantics.
Sider (2002, 2009, 2011) embraces the metaphysical view I hope 
to undermine, which holds that there is both an objective structure to 
reality, and a unique language that mirrors this structure:
…some candidate meanings [for an expression] ‘carve nature at the joints’ 
more than others, and it is part of the nature of reference and meaning that 
candidates that carve nature [closer to] its joints are more eligible to be 
meant. The meaning of a word, then, is the best candidate, where strength 
of candidacy is based on (1) fi t with meaning-determining facts about the 
speaker or her linguistic community, and (2) intrinsic eligibility on the part 
of the candidate. (Sider 2002: xxi)
Sider embraces the fi rst of these criteria in defense of using natural 
languages as metaphysical guides, holding that the use of natural lan-
guage expressions constrains the space of any given expression’s pos-
sible “joint-carving” meanings. Applying such criteria makes sense for 
ontological investigation only if the relevant language has a semantics 
that determines the referents for expressions in that language. On this 
assumption, the quantifi cational commitments of true sentences in 
such a language constitute the domain of entities that stand to satisfy 
the truth-conditions of sentences in that language. And insofar as that 
language refl ects the “jointedness” or structure of reality, this domain 
is just the domain of things that exist.
Such a language must have a semantics that is externalist. Put more 
precisely, this metaphysical methodology is committed to the following 
hypothesis pertaining to the (class of) language(s) it deems useful for 
metaphysical investigation:
(ε) For any expression e (in a given language L), the meaning of e de-
termines e’s truth-conditions.
For the externalist, the meaning of an expression determines its satis-
faction-conditions or truth-conditions,1 either by identifying meanings 
with truth-conditions, or by identifying the propositional content of a 
linguistic expression in a way that determines the truth-conditions of 
the expression. Likewise, the meaning of a word determines the mind-
independent objects that constitute the word’s extension.2
1 I use ‘truth-condition’ from here on, and in (ε) as short-hand for the much 
clumsier ‘truth-condition or satisfaction-condition’. The purpose for marking the 
distinction between these types of conditions is to mark the difference between 
sentences and sub-sentential expressions. Since sub-sentential expressions cannot 
be true nor false, they cannot have truth-conditions. But I trust that adopting this 
convention here will not lead to much confusion.
2 The exact scope of this claim, and related externalist assumptions will be teased 
out with more precision in what follows, particularly in §2.1 and §4.1. To advertise a 
bit, the meaning of indexical expressions, even according to externalists, will fail to 
determine their truth-conditions in the absence of a (index providing) context. This 
sort of concern is (I think) not terribly vexing, in that externalism can accommodate 
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Despite the long-standing tradition in linguistics and philosophy 
of treating meanings as relations words bear to worldly objects, I will 
argue that natural language meanings are hostile to such externalist 
treatment. Most prominently, natural language expressions routinely 
exhibit a kind of lexical fl exibility suggested by Chomsky and others, 
and this fl exibility is ill-captured by the rigid models available to the 
externalist. Accommodating this fl exibility under an externalist se-
mantics either yields implausible ontological burdens on such theories, 
or belies good explanations for the relevant data, lending increased 
credibility to an internalist3 approach to linguistic meaning.4
Importantly, these fi ndings bear on the projects of metaphysicians 
that see natural language meanings as suitable tools for ontological 
investigation. If natural languages are mind-dependent, and are poor-
ly characterized by externalist semantic machinery, then the Realist’s 
metaphysical methodology that reads ontology off of the qualifi cational 
commitments of natural language meanings is without foundation. The 
purpose of this paper is two-fold: fi rst to undermine the basic exter-
nalist claim that the meaning of an expression determines its truth-
conditions, and second, thereby undermine the Realist use of natural 
language meanings—and the intuitive judgments that rely on them—
as useful tools in metaphysical inquiry. The goal is to undermine (ε ), in 
the following Realist argument:
(ε ) For any expression e (in a given language L), the meaning of e de-
termines e’s truth-conditions.
 If natural language meanings determine the truth-conditions and 
referents of their constituent expressions, then natural languages 
can play an important role in ontological investigation…
 …since the meanings of true natural language expressions will 
pick out their real-world referents to populate the worldly domain.
If the meanings of terms in a natural language fail to determine their 
truth-conditions (and their constituents’ referents), then investigating 
ontology by analyzing the meanings of true natural language expres-
sions will yield indeterminate answers to ontological questions. The 
thought is that, with an adequately regimented natural language, one 
where vague and imprecise terms have been purged from the lexicon, 
such cases. So while some considerations for the role of context in determining a 
sentence’s truth-conditions are needed, the core Fregean ideal captured in (ε ) is at 
the heart of externalism.
3 While the purpose of this paper is not to directly argue for such theories, 
see Pietroski (2008); Pietroski (2010); Pietroski (forthcoming) and Hinzen (2006); 
Hinzen (2007).
4 Some care will be taken regarding the terminology here, since ‘meaning’ has 
been used to identify numerous different properties associated with natural language 
expressions, utterances, interpretations, and the content of a bit of communication. 
In §4.1 these differences are spelled out, but for the time being, ‘linguistic meaning’ 
here is intended to identify the meaning properties of an expression that remain 
constant across various contexts in which that expression is used.
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philosophers can make use of meaningful expressions in that language 
to do metaphysics, by tracing the meanings of terms in true expres-
sions to their referents. It’s this thought, and the externalist assump-
tion (ε ) presupposed by it, that I argue is troubled.
2. Setup
2. 1. Taxonomy
The bulk of this paper is committed to advancing arguments against 
externalism. But before we proceed, some distinctions may be help-
ful. For purposes of taxonomy we should distinguish between inter-
nalist and externalist views about both meanings, and languages. As 
I understand the externalist’s commitments, the meanings of natural 
language expressions are relations (of a particular sort). Meanings on 
internalist theories are non-relational, at least where one of the relata 
is a publicly available thing.5
The internalist/externalist distinction pertaining to language re-
gards the ontological nature of languages. For the externalist view of 
language, languages are mind-independent things, while for the inter-
nalist, languages are aspects of the human mind. The logical space of 
externalist views regarding language and meaning are exhausted by 
adopting either 1) an internalist or externalist view about language, 
and 2) an internalist or externalist view about meanings.6 Thus one can 
be an internalist about language (IL) or an externalist about language 
(EL), holding that language is either in the mind or not.7 Similarly, one 
can be an internalist about meaning (IM) or an externalist about mean-
ing (EM), holding that meanings either are relations between words 
and objects, or not. As such, the logical space of views is displayed in 
the following:
5 Drawing the distinction along relational lines under-determines the content of 
internalist theories of meaning, but for our purposes here, the under-determination 
is immaterial. Insofar as any externalist semantics relates publicly available things 
to natural language expressions (and internalist theories do not), if such a semantics 
cannot account for the linguistic data, this undermines (ε ).
6 For the sake of completeness, one could also deny the existence of either 
languages or meanings. The motivations for either position aside, the Realist (the 
target of this work) would not welcome such a defl ationary view.
7 This is an over-simplifi cation. One can remain agnostic about the ontology of 
language, while denying an externalist conception (cf. Hinzen 2007: §1.5). One could 
also deny that there are languages at all, a claim many Chomskyans seem to endorse 
(cf. Chomsky 1986). Such theorists are considered internalists in the literature. I 
ignore this distinction for the purpose of simplicity, as nothing I say here trades on 
this distinction.
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Table 1: Exter nalist and Internalist View
Internalism 
Meaning (IM)
Externalism 
Meaning (EM)
Internalism 
Language (IL) IL-IM IL-EM
Externalism 
Language (EL) EL-IM EL-EM
2.2. Assumptions/Motivations
Anti-externalist arguments target both EL and EM theories. Though 
these two classes of arguments can be treated distinctly, they share a 
series of assumptions and motivations. Most notably they are inspired 
by a Chomskyan approach to language generally. In part this embod-
ies a commitment to a naturalistic methodology. On this approach, 
language is treated as an object of scientifi c investigation, as a natu-
rally occurring phenomenon, in principle no different than biological 
reproduction, combustion, planetary motion, or viscosity. This focus is 
not merely on empirical investigation, but that such investigation can 
make testable predictions, provide insightful explanations, and can be 
integrated with other scientifi c disciplines—most notably psychology 
and biology.
That humans have the ability to communicate the content of their 
thoughts via vocalization, and that we learn to do this in a short four 
years, are naturally occurring phenomena that beg for an (naturalistic) 
explanation. Explaining these phenomena in large part requires char-
acterizing what it is to understand a language—put fl at-footedly, one 
must “know English” in order to “use English.” As such, the study of 
language should seek to answer three questions:
(i) What constitutes knowledge of language?
(ii) How is knowledge of language acquired?
(iii) How is knowledge of language put to use?
    (Chomsky 1986: 3)
As Chomsky (1986) argues (and as we’ll see in §3), this commitment to 
naturalism and the guiding questions in (i)–(iii) rule out certain con-
ceptions of language as viable candidates of study. They are excluded 
simply because language on these conceptions cannot be investigated 
through naturalistic means. Importantly, the veracity of these argu-
ments depends on the success of the research program that insists on 
investigating language by naturalistic means. If the endeavors of such 
a research program bear no explanatory fruit, then that failure tells 
against treating language (and meaning) as a natural phenomenon. 
There is little doubt however whether the Chomskyan tradition in lin-
guistics has failed in this regard (Baker 2002; Boeckx 2006; Piattelli-
Palmarini et al. 2009).
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2.3. Outline
The argument presented here is two-fold. First, I bring together vari-
ous considerations, from different sources, which collectively offer suf-
fi cient reasons to doubt the truth of the claims adopted by externalists, 
in particular (ε ). In the course of presenting these arguments I will 
both draw novel connections between the points offered by others, and 
consider (to then rebuff) externalist replies to them. The result then, 
is a series of considerations that collectively count against both the 
view that languages are mind-independent objects (i.e. EL theories), 
and the externalist thesis (ε ) as it pertains to natural languages (i.e. 
EM theories).
The arguments offered here do not show that externalism is false. 
The purpose of gathering together this evidence is to show that the ex-
ternalist hypothesis (ε ) is contentious and troubled, and not an obvious 
truth to be taken as the starting point for other domains of inquiry.8 
The second part of the argument here presses this point, since much 
metaphysical investigation assumes the truth of this externalist thesis. 
If the considerations offered here against the externalist proposal are 
indeed as troubling as I claim, then the Realist that conducts onto-
logical inquiry by way of natural language meanings is burdened with 
those troubles.
I begin by addressing externalist views that treat languages as 
mind-external objects (i.e., EL theories), by arguing that such views 
forestall attempts to address central questions about the human capac-
ity to use and acquire natural languages. In §4 I turn to externalist 
views about meaning (i.e., EM theories). Because of the long standing 
externalist tradition in linguistics and philosophy of language, I begin 
that section with a lengthy clarifi cation, indicating the sort of linguis-
tic phenomena that I do not think are troubling for the externalist. So 
clarifi ed, I argue that the lexical fl exibility exhibited by broad swaths 
of natural language expressions are poorly explained by the externalist 
hypothesis (ε ). I consider possible externalist responses to the chal-
lenge presented by such fl exibility before turning to the assumed role 
of mental content at play in EM theories. There I stress the complex 
relationship between linguistic expressions and the concepts they pur-
portedly express, noting that the commonly held labeling theory of lin-
guistic meaning—whereby words are merely labels for concepts—faces 
two profound diffi culties. After presenting this rather large body of evi-
dence against various externalist commitments, I conclude by arguing 
that these considerations against externalism present a fundamental 
challenge for Realist metaphysical methodologies, by showing that 
they assume the externalist theses this evidence renders contentious. 
8 It’s worth remembering here the oft-quoted claim from Lewis (1970), the 
progenitor of contemporary metaphysics, whereby he boldly asserts the externalist 
hunch, with little argument: “Semantics with no treatment of truth-conditions is not 
semantics.”
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The consequence for the Realist is that her use of natural language 
meanings to address metaphysical questions is unjustifi ed.
3. Langu ages as Objects
3.1. Arg uments Against EL Theories
There are two conceptions of the ontology of languages, an externalist 
(EL) view of language and an internalist (IL) view of language. The 
former view construes a language as a mind independent (abstract) 
object. Languages on this conception are abstract structures relating 
mind-independent objects to terms, words, or expressions—artifacts 
in some sense, that we use to denote (other) objects. Accordingly, one 
understands a language when they can identify and use the abstract 
structure that most sensibly coheres with the usage in their linguistic 
community. This conception of language can be found in Lewis (1970, 
1975):
What is a language? Something that assigns meanings to certain strings of 
types of sounds or of marks. It could therefore be a function, a set of ordered 
pairs of strings and meanings. (Lewis 1975)
A commitment to naturalism speaks against thinking of languages as 
the abstract objects described here. In treating a language as a mind 
external object, as Lewis (1975) puts it, “in complete abstraction from 
human affairs” one wants to know how humans can come to under-
stand or “know” languages so construed (p. 19). That is, on this Lewis-
ian characterization, languages are abstracta: functions that take us 
from symbols to truth values, combined with a grammar that delin-
eates how these symbols can be combined in acceptable ways to form 
interpretable expressions (or strings). If a naturalistic approach to lan-
guage seeks to answer (i) what knowledge of a language amounts to, a 
Lewisian treatment of language renders this question intractable. As 
an infi nitely-membered set of ordered pairs of expressions and their 
functional meanings, this conception of language not only gives us little 
direction as to how to answer (i), but seemingly gives too sparse a col-
lection of resources to answer the question at all. Put more tangibly, 
all children (placed within a linguistic environment) have adult-like 
competence with a natural language by the age of four. A child when 
placed in a community of English speakers will come to “know English” 
by the age of four. On a Lewisian view, for a child to “know English” 
they must fi rst decide which set amongst an infi nite array of (infi nite-
ly-membered) sets of expression-function pairs is the English set, and 
then second, they must bear the right kind of epistemic relation to that 
set. As such, to explain what knowledge of a language (so construed) 
amounts to requires an account of the sort of relation that a human can 
bear to an abstract entity such that this is the sort of relation a four-
year-old child can enter.
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The worry here is not that, given certain metaphysical commit-
ments to nominalism, any theory committing us to abstracta is off base. 
The worry Chomsky presses pertains to the conditions for explanation, 
and particularly whether certain conceptions of language (whatever 
their metaphysical commitments) forestall viable strategies to answer-
ing fundamental questions. Treating languages as abstract entities is 
problematic not because they are abstracta, but because abstracta qua 
objects of knowledge bear mysterious epistemic relations to human 
minds. As such, to explain what knowledge of a language (so construed) 
amounts to requires an account of the sort of relation that a human can 
bear to an abstract entity, and in particular a set of ordered pairs, such 
that this is the sort of relation a four-year-old child can enter. How one 
proceeds to answer these questions seems hopelessly unclear.9
Chomsky puts a related point about language acquisition in terms 
of “legibility conditions” on a natural language. If a child is to come 
to have “knowledge of a language,” they must come to represent that 
language in their mind/brain. For a given child to have “knowledge of 
English,” they must have come to represent both the grammar of Eng-
lish—the algorithms by which one can combine lexical items to form 
larger expressions (or sentences)—and at the very least, some internal-
ized list of those lexical items that combine syntactically. In whatever 
way this information is encoded in the mind/brain, it must fi t into the 
architecture of the mind/brain. If our four-year-old has fi gured out, or 
“knows”, which grammar (as an abstract object on an EL theory) is the 
English grammar, she has represented such a grammar in her mind/
brain. When she wants to utter an English sentence this grammatical 
knowledge must be applied (to the lexical items she also “knows”) in 
such a way so that her articulatory systems can make the right sort of 
audible noise. That is, the representations she builds using her gram-
matical knowledge must encode information in a way that her articu-
latory system can make sense of—those instructions must be legible. 
Thus the structure of the abstract object that is English must abide 
by such legibility conditions, coming not only from the articulatory 
system, but from any other aspect of the mind/brain that the child’s 
linguistic knowledge must interact with. But once we recognize that 
the structure of the abstract object English is beholden to the legibility 
9 A Lewisian might argue that such an explanation need not be directly 
forthcoming for the project of building an externalist semantics for externally 
construed languages to proceed. After all, humans somehow manage to learn 
mathematics, and the best account of the ontological nature of mathematical 
language is decidedly abstract, and set-theoretical. So clearly (the thought goes) 
humans can stand in the relevant epistemic relation to abstract objects, and in 
particular abstractly construed languages. Notice however, that four-year-old 
children do not exhibit mastery and competence with the language of mathematics, 
even if they do have innate mental structures that aid them in acquiring profi ciency 
with numerosity (Carey 2009: Ch. 4). This contrast between children’s felicity with 
mathematical and natural languages requires an explanation, and that explanation 
is precisely what the Chomskyan challenge to EL views demands.
 C. A. Vogel, Lexical Flexibility, Natural Language, and Ontology 9
conditions imposed by the human mind/brain, this defeases the motiva-
tions for thinking of a language in this abstract way Chomsky (2000).10 
Taken together, considerations of acquisition and legibility pose seri-
ous, and as far as I can see, unanswered challenges for EL theories.
None of this shows that these abstracta do not exist. There could 
well be, in addition to the mental structures hypothesized (and stud-
ied) by the Chomskyan tradition, functions fi lling an infi nite Fregean 
hierarchy mapping objects of one kind (say <e>) to objects of another 
kind (say <t>). But these functions must earn their keep. We are told 
that we should believe in these abstracta because they are essential to 
successful explanations of linguistic phenomena (Lewis 1986: Ch. 1). 
The point here about legibility conditions is that these structures serve 
no explanatory purpose, and indeed present explanatory obstacles, in 
explaining how a child comes to “know” a language. Thus, the external-
ist owes us some indication of what these objects are meant to explain.
One possible explanatory virtue of adopting an externalist view 
about languages (and meanings) is that it yields an intuitively plau-
sible account of successful communication. If languages (or their mean-
ings) are external entities, then successful human communication is 
explained by the mutual relatedness of individuals to the language(s) 
they know. That is, two humans can succeed in communicating because 
they are related to, or come to understand, the very same thing—a 
language. But this explanatory virtue depends on the availability of a 
cogent specifi cation of the individuation conditions for the external lan-
guages that individual speakers come to grasp. The prospects for these 
conditions, I contend, are grim, at least for the Realist.
3.2. Gri m Prospects for Linguistic Objects
Commitments to naturalism motivate the ontological arguments 
against EL theories above. EL theories hold that natural languages are 
objects-in-the-world, whose existence is independent of minds. As such, 
expressions of a natural language are likewise objects-in-the-world. 
As we saw in the previous section, naturalist inquiry into the acquisi-
tion of natural language compels the externalist to defend the utility 
of EL conceptions of language. An externalist might reply, indicating 
that treating languages as publicly available objects yields a plausible 
account of linguistic communication. If languages are mind-external 
10 Chomsky also argues that treating languages as abstract structures, akin 
to the formal languages of mathematics, renders aspects of natural languages 
inexplicable, in principle. Chomsky uses two examples, ‘imperfections’ in natural 
languages, to highlight the mismatch between the structure of natural languages 
and formal languages: 1) that natural languages have uninterpretable features, and 
2) the displacement property (Chomsky 2000). Even if treating natural languages 
like formal ones leaves room for explaining such features, the point here is that 
there is no good justifi cation for stipulating at the outset of investigation that the 
object to be investigated must meet the (optimality) conditions of a formal language 
(especially if even superfi cial differences speak against such stipulation).
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things, communication between speakers can be understood by way 
of their respective relations to the same publicly available thing—the 
language they all are said to know. One strain of internalist arguments 
presses this ontological claim, showing that there is no scientifi cally 
respectable notion of ‘natural language expression’. More plainly, these 
arguments contend that mind-independent words (and thereby, mind-
independent languages) do not exist, and thus cannot stand in any (ref-
erence/meaning) relation to any object in the world.
One motivation for thinking of languages as external is to account 
for communicative success. In order for two speakers to understand 
one another, they must know the same language, and this (so goes the 
argument) can be explained if there is some single mind-external thing 
they both know. Knowledge of language on this view is had when a 
speaker bears the right sort of relation to this external object. Thus two 
speakers that “know English” can make sense of each other’s speech 
because they bear the same relation to the same mind-external object. 
Thus when you use a sentence(-object) of English, I understand this 
sentence because I am related to that same English object in the same 
way you are, via knowing. However, this requires that languages can 
be differentiated ontologically, insofar as you and I must bear the same 
relation to the same language.11
For purposes of differentiation, “common sense” methods will not do. 
As Chomsky notes, common sense treats Dutch and German as distinct 
languages, despite the fact that people “who live near the Dutch border 
can communicate quite well with those living on the German side…” 
(Chomsky 2000: 48). If treating languages as mind-external objects is 
meant to explain communicative success, then the fact that speakers of 
“different languages” can communicate linguistically12 is unexplained 
by such theories. The common sense notion of language gets the exten-
sion wrong in the other direction as well, insofar as the Mandarin and 
Cantonese spoken “dialects” of “the Chinese language” are mutually 
11 There is a fundamental problem with this conception of language, namely that 
any particular human will fail to completely know any such “language.” Externally 
construed as an infi nite set of expression-meaning pairs, no individual will come 
to have full knowledge of a language, at least if such knowledge is construed as 
knowing what the members of this set are. Given the limits on human cognition, 
no individual could know this infi nitely long list of pairs. At best, we must have 
an incomplete knowledge of such a “language.” But the account of communicative 
success above assumes that two speakers stand in the same relation to the same 
object. If a language is an infi nitely large set of sentence-meaning pairs, two 
speakers of that language either: (a) stand in a different (incomplete) knowing 
relation to that same set, or (b) stand in the knowing relation to different subsets 
of that set. Thus if appeals to some external entity are meant to aid in explaining 
how humans manage to successfully communicate, such an explanation will have to 
succeed despite the fact no human can fully know such a language. See Dummett 
(1978, 1993) for discussion.
12 Humans, and other animals, communicate in many non-linguistic ways: body 
language, facial expression, gesture, etc. The important cases for this point are those 
instances of communication that are clearly effected with language.
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unintelligible. The EL-view here fails to explain why these speakers of 
“Chinese” cannot communicate via spoken language, since (according 
to common sense) the relevant populations both “know Chinese.”
Since the common sense division of languages will not serve the 
purpose of explaining communicative success, another means of dis-
tinguishing languages (as objects) is in order. One might appeal to the 
elements of languages to distinguish them. On this proposal, two lan-
guages, (say) English and French, are distinct because of the differenc-
es between the elements that constitute them—one contains words like 
‘photographer’, ‘apartment’, and ‘cat’ while the other contains words 
like ‘photographe’, ‘appartement’, and ‘chat’. This move requires that 
these elements differ along some important dimension, such that the 
fi rst three belong to English and the last three belong to French. Notice 
that appealing to usage will not be helpful. Defi ning ‘French’ and ‘Eng-
lish’ by indicating that speakers of French use the latter and speakers 
of English use the former is viciously circular.
An EL theorist must make use of some other property that these 
words share that marks the boundary between English and French. 
But to what properties could an EL theorist appeal? The sonic proper-
ties of these words seem like bad candidates. ‘Cat’ and ‘Chat’ have more 
in common in this regard than ‘photographer’ and ‘cat’ do. Further, 
considering the variation seen in pronunciation across speakers of the 
“same word”, appeal to such properties will not distinguish words as to 
cohere with the communicative motivations for EL theories:
To take an example, why are ‘fotoGRAFer’ (said in Bombay) and ‘foTAH-
grafer’ (said in Toronto) the same word, yet ‘fotOgrafo’ (said in Buenos Ai-
res) is not the same word as the former two? (Stainton 2006: 918–919)
To explain communicative success and failure, the EL theorist posits 
the mind-external object English that our Bombay speaker and Toronto 
speaker both “know”, distinguished from other languages based on the 
elements of that language—words like ‘photographer’. In this example, 
the EL theorists wants to say that we have two words here (as opposed 
to one or three), one in English and one in Spanish. Appealing to the 
sonic properties of (utterances of) words here will clearly not help such 
a theorist, given variations in pronunciation.13 The point is familiar to 
phonologists, namely that there is no sui generis cluster of sonic prop-
erties that utterances of a word share in common. What ‘fotoGRAFer’ 
and ‘foTAHgrafer’ share in common is the manner in which they are 
represented by humans, which involves features of the system for cre-
ating phonological representations from environmental noise.14 There 
are then no word-objects that can be differentiated without appeal to 
structures of the human mind/brain—or no such objects that can be 
investigated by naturalistic means.
13 Appeals to orthography will not be any more helpful here given that illiterate 
individuals can communicate using spoken language quite well.
14 See Bromberger & Halle (1995) for discussion.
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These problems are particularly trenchant for theorists committed 
to a Realist position. For the Realist the naturalist perspective is not 
negotiable. If there is no mind-external, naturalistically respectable 
notion of ‘natural language expression’, and thus no worldly objects of 
that sort, then there can be no (semantic) relations between words and 
objects. Such a Realist cannot fall back on a kind of pluralism or fi ction-
alism about words, because their methodology prohibits such a retreat.
Thus a commitment to naturalism will preclude certain notions of 
language, specifi cally those that construe natural languages as mind-
independent abstract entities. However, this naturalistic commitment 
does not preclude a semantics for an I(L)-language from having an ex-
ternalist character. Even if language is properly construed as an aspect 
of the human mind, the expressions of that language, seen as mental 
representations, can still have contents that are cashed out in terms 
of mind-independent objects. Such an account of meaning is still im-
portantly externalist. This view pushes the externalist to adopt two 
positions: fi rst, an EM conception of linguistic meaning, and second 
an externalist account of mental content. In the remaining sections 
I discuss problems for both of these views. I turn next to the various 
arguments put forward for why (natural) I(L)-language meanings are 
hostile to externalist treatment.
4. Compo sitional Referential Semantics 
and Natural Language
A theory of meaning for a natural language should provide a means for 
pairing sentences of a natural language with their meanings. Various 
semantic theories accomplish this goal in varying ways, but externalist 
semantic theories insist that such a paring requires relating sentences 
to objects in a (worldly) domain. These various EM theories adopt the 
thesis in (ε ). But a theory of meaning must also explain the distribu-
tion of competent speaker judgments about natural language construc-
tions. This includes (but is not limited to) judgments about inferences 
speakers draw between expressions, and the meanings they are (not) 
apt to assign to expressions. A theory of meaning ought to offer a plau-
sible explanation for this data.
The primary strain of anti-externalist arguments I will press illus-
trate that an externalist semantics cannot obviously accommodate the 
relevant data, or that in accommodating the relevant linguistic data 
such a semantics must take on board independently implausible as-
sumptions. As a means of articulating the data points I contend EM 
theories fail to capture, I’ll begin this section by briefl y indicating what 
these criticism are not arguing.
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4.1. Ho w Not to Argue against Externalism
There is a line of criticisms attributable to Austin (1962), Strawson 
(1950), and Wittgenstein (1953, 1972) regarding externalist seman-
tics summarized by indicating that words do not refer/denote, users of 
words do.15 One way of explaining this point is to highlight the role of 
indexicals (and demonstratives) like ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘here’, ‘now’, and ‘that’ in 
determining the meanings of expressions that contain them. The mean-
ing of indexicals are intimately tied to the context of their use. Even 
if we accept that sentences like (1) have constituents with referential 
meanings,16 sentences like (2)–(4) do not, because they are importantly 
incomplete (nonsensical for Wittgenstein17) outside of their use:
 (1) Kiruna is foggy.
 (2) I think that should g o there.
 (3) I am here.
 (4) I am a philosop her .
Sentences with indexicals, l ike (2), (3) and (4), have different meanings 
when uttered by different agents (at different times, different places, 
and using different gestures). In such cases, context plays the role of 
determining the referent of the indexical constituent(s) of these expres-
sions. Call this the role played by semantic context. The meaning of 
these expressions determine their truth-conditions, in a context that 
supplies coordinates for the indexes proposed to be part of their inter-
pretations, and thereby maintains the externalist idea that meanings 
determine the truth-conditions of expressions (Kaplan, 1977 [1989]). 
Such cases do not undermine EM theories.18
15 To quote Strawson (1950): “Referring is not something an expression does; it is 
something that someone can use an expression to do.”
16 Though this is far from obvious, despite what traditional semantics textbooks 
might suggest. Even if the conditions that satisfy the predicate ‘is foggy’ are codifi ed, 
consider the ontological status of a city that moves from one location to another 
location two miles to the east (Rolander 2013). And even if those metaphysical 
diffi culties can be met, it is far from clear how such a view can account for sentences 
like “The tallest mountain in Sweden, Kebnekaise is situated 100 km or 62 miles 
from Kiruna. …Nowadays the town [of Kiruna] is not relying solely on the mine” 
(girontravel.se, 2013). While a city construed as a spatio-temporal object might well 
be situated some distance from some other object, and might even survive relocation, 
such an object is not of the sort that relies on anything, much less revenue. See 
Chomsky (2000) for examples of this sort regarding London.
17 See Wittgenstein (1972: §10).
18 Strawson and Wittgenstein would surely disagree. Broadly, the point pressed 
by many ordinary language philosophers is that the sort of distinction presented 
here between semantic and cognitive context, and indeed the semantics/pragmatics 
distinction generally, is misguided. My brief treatment of these concerns here is 
meant merely to clarify the arguments proffered in the remainder of this section. Even 
if the externalist can address the problems raised by Strawson and Wittgenstein, 
possibly in the manner indicated here, many trenchant problems remain. My thanks 
to an anonymous reviewer for raising this concern.
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There are other ways in which the context of an expression’s use 
can impact or “change” the meaning of the expression. Consider the 
following expression:
 (5) Barack Obama is human.
The “literal” meaning of this ex pression, on an externalist understand-
ing, indicates that some particular individual has a particular proper-
ty. I can use this expression to convey a thought, the meaning of which 
is that some individual is a homo sapiens, on those occasions where I 
intend to convey the linguistic meaning of the expression. The related 
Austin-inspired point regarding the (externalist) meanings of expres-
sions contends that because we use language in non-literal ways, and 
further that such non-literal usage is pervasive, the meanings of ex-
pressions are the conditions of their use. Thus what a sentence means 
follows from the contexts in which a speaker can felicitously use the 
sentence. For example, one could use (5) in various ways:
 (5) Barack Obama is human. Context: Obama has made some  
  mistake.
In uttering (5) in the context of Obama’s mistake in (5), I do not merely 
intend to communicate information about Obama’s place on the phylo-
genetic tree. My usage communicates (or intends to communicate) the 
linguistic meaning acontextually attributable to the expression in (6):
 (6) One should refrain from feelings of disapprobation toward 
  Obama in this instance in light of the fallibility of humans.
Call the role context plays in such cases cognitive context.19 This non-
literal usage of language is pervasive.20
However, this fea ture of language does little to undermine the ex-
ternalist program in semantics. That we can use sentences to convey 
thoughts that do not match the intuitive literal meanings of expres-
19 For a discussion of this differing role of context, and the distinction between 
semantic and cognitive context see Bach (1999, 2004).
20 This feature of natural language seems to be at the heart of Strawson (1950), 
which is often misunderstood as merely indicating the context sensitivity of 
indexical (and demonstrative) expressions. While one way of making “different use 
of the same sentence” is to use an indexical expression in different contexts, this is 
but an instance of a more general phenomenon (Strawson 1950). The general point 
for Strawson is that the proposition expressed by a speaker, and thus whether what 
is spoken is true, depends quite heavily on the context of utterance (and the use 
of the sentence)—a point Russell seems to miss. Strawson focuses on the context 
sensitivity of indexicals, largely embedded in defi nite descriptions, because he 
argues that Russell’s theory of descriptions, which sacrifi ces the connection between 
grammatical and logical form for the sake of sentential truth preservation, does 
so needlessly (Strawson 1950). The theory is not needed, according to Strawson, 
because sentences are not true or false, uses of sentences in utterances are. Russell’s 
reply seems to miss this substantive point: “As regards ‘the present King of France’, 
[Strawson] fastens upon the egocentric word ‘present’ and does not seem able to 
grasp that, if for the word ‘present’ I had substituted the words ‘in 1905’, the whole 
of his argument would have collapsed” (Russell 1957).
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sions requires that expressions have static linguistic meanings that are 
context-independent.21 And this literal meaning could be externalist, 
even if the communicative intention of a speaker using such a meaning 
heavily depends on cognitive context.
The gap between linguistic meaning and the thought inferred by an 
audience to a speech act (or utterance) does not present a problem for 
truth-conditional semantics. However, some utterances closer to the 
semantic-pragmatic boundary seem more troubling. Consider the fol-
lowing examples:
 (7) John is too smart [for this job].
 (8) John fi nished [writing/playing] the so nata.
 (9) John is ready [for class/to go home/…].
Each of these sentences, though acceptable to co mpetent speakers of 
English, seem (in some sense) incomplete, as indicated by the brack-
eted content. For the externalist, the linguistic meaning of expressions 
of the form in (9) [NP–COP–XP] predicate properties to the individual(s) 
denoted by the noun phrase. ‘John is awake’, for example, predicates of 
the individual denoted by ‘John’ that he is not asleep. But the meaning 
of (9) does not predicate some general property of readiness to John.22
Interestingly, these sentences and their completed counterparts 
stand in a relationship that exhibits features typically attributed to se-
mantic properties, yet seem to be driven by pragmatic inferences. The 
21 In uttering a sentence, I intend to communicate some thought or other. The 
task of my audience is to infer this thought from the sentence I used in my act of 
uttering. Given my overt intention to communicate a thought, my audience must 
identify the intended thought, in some way or other (Grice, 1957 [1989]). Contextual 
cues, shared biological sense modalities, a common presupposed set of knowledge, 
and other aspects of the uttering act all constitute the evidence available to my 
audience in making the correct inference about my intention. When communication 
is successful, they ascertain my actual intention. But paramount among the 
evidence considered in this inferential move is the choice of sentence used in the 
utterance. That I utter (5) and not (say) its negation in the context indicated in (5) 
seems to matter, and it matters precisely because the sentence has a static linguistic 
meaning. Were the sentence void of any literal meaning, it could play no role in my 
audience’s inference making. That I cannot communicate the thought in (6) by using 
any expression I choose illustrates this point. There are limits on what a speaker 
can reasonably expect his audience to infer about his communicative intention on an 
occasion of utterance, and largely this is because expressions have static linguistic 
meanings.
22 Though this seems to be the view of Cappelen & Lepore (2005). This view 
however, fails to explain what needs explanation in these cases. Namely, competent 
speakers of English treat (9a) and (9b) as having the same meaning. The disquotational 
account of meaning fails to capture this data in any non-stipulative way. In fact, for 
Cappelen & Lepore (2005) the proposition expressed by a sentence is the disquotated 
sentence once we “disambiguate every ambiguous/polysemous expression in [the 
sentence]” (p. 145). However, the presumption that cases of ambiguity and polysemy 
can be resolved, prior to giving a semantics for the expression either denies that 
the data need explanation or denies that there are any data there to explain. For 
(9a) and (9b), that speakers treat these sentence as having the same meaning is 
ill-captured by a theory that insists they express distinct (disquotated) propositions.
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relationship between (9a) and (9b) is different than the relationship 
between (5) and (6).
 (9) a. John is ready.
   b. John is ready for it.
 (5) Barack Obama is human.
 ( 6) One should refrain from feelings of disapprobation toward
  Obama in this instance in light of the fallibility of humans.
Cases like (9a) and (9b) present a problem because the role that context 
plays seems to be more general (or cognitive), while exhibiting (seman-
tic) entailment patterns that pragmatic cases do not. To complete (9a) 
and arrive at (9b), my audience has to make use of knowledge not pro-
vided by the semantic context, specifi cally knowledge about readiness. 
Yet (9a) and (9b) exhibit a mutually entailing relationship that prag-
matically inferred thoughts rarely have. Regardless of how (semantic) 
context provides the expression ‘it’ with the relevant event that John is 
ready for in (9b), this determination will (for the externalist) determine 
the truth-conditions for the expression. But any context in which the 
provided event makes (9b) true, also makes (9a) true.
The worry then is this: (9a) and (9b) seem to have the same truth-
conditions, yet appear to have different meanings, insofar as (9a) is 
incomplete and (9b) is not. For the externalist, the truth-conditions of 
an expression are determined by its meaning. That they come apart in 
these cases is troubling for the externalist view.23
The anti-externalist arguments in the remainder of this section are 
not the (now) traditional worry associated with Strawson, Austin, and 
Wittgenstein that a single expression can be used in a variety of ways 
to express a variety of thoughts. Nor is the worry expressed by inter-
nalists that expressions with indexical constituents require context 
to determine their truth-conditions. Such points do not speak against 
an externalist semantics (though they indicate that (ε ) requires some 
clarifi cation regarding the determination relation). The point that 
internalist worries stress is that, while the meanings of indexical ex-
pressions might be well-captured by appeals to (something like) the 
content-character distinction, they are a special case of a much more 
general phenomenon that is misrepresented by such treatment, and 
exhibited by case like (7)–(9). Natural language expressions exhibit a 
kind of lexical fl exibility that is not isolated to a few problem cases to 
be addressed by intricate logics, but is a ubiquitous feature of natu-
ral languages—one that is importantly misrepresented by Kaplanian 
treatment. It is to this phenomenon that I now turn.
23 Stanley (2000), for example, notes this trouble and offers a solution to cases 
of this kind by introducing unarticulated syntactic constituents. My purpose here is 
not to evaluate the merits of every externalist reply to such cases. I introduce them 
here merely to suggest the sort of worries I will (not) focus on in the remainder of 
this section.
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4.2. Lex ical Flexibility
An externalist semantics, or EM theory, must be capable of explaining 
or accommodating the distribution of meaning assignments competent 
speakers of a language give to expressions. In the previous section we 
reviewed proposed counterexamples to (ε). In response to these cases 
(ε ) could be maintained, by adding characters to the meanings of ex-
pressions, as is done for indexicals. In this section, we will consider 
phenomena that cannot be so easily accommodated, namely those re-
lated to lexical fl exibility.
Chomsky (1977) marks a distinction between various ways in which 
the meaning of an expression can be multifarious, distinguishing be-
tween expressions that exhibit fl exibility24 from those that exhibit am-
biguity. The English word ‘trunk’ is ambiguous, with meanings used 
to denote both luggage, and a part of an elephant (not to mention tree 
parts, and humans parts). This kind of multifarious meaning is im-
portantly different than the kind exhibited by expressions like ‘book’. 
Compare the following expressions:
 (10) John wrote a book.
 (11) This book weighs fi ve pounds.
The use of ‘book’ in (11) is used to deno te a particular, concrete (heavy) 
book. For (11) to be true there must be a contextually relevant physi-
cal thing with a particular heft. However, for (10) to be true there is no 
such requirement. As Chomsky notes, John could have the book com-
posed in his mind, having never deployed pen and paper. This might 
lead us to conclude that the multifarious meaning of ‘book’ is like the 
ambiguity of ‘trunk’: we have two distinct (homophonous) lexical items, 
‘booka’ corresponding to the abstract usage in (10) and ‘bookc’ corre-
sponding to the concrete usage in (11).
However, if this treatment of ‘book’ is apt, we should expect uses of 
‘book’ to behave like uses of ‘trunk’, since ‘trunk’ is ambiguous is the 
way ‘book’ is purported to be on this explanation. That ‘book’ is less 
24 Often this phenomenon is termed ‘polysemy’ in the literature. I avoid the term 
here for two reasons, one priggish, and one substantive. The priggish reason is that 
the term ‘polysemy’ indicates (by its roots) that a polysemous word has multiple 
meanings. This is true for such terms of course, but ambiguous words are also ones 
with multiple meanings. Thus the contrast in the literature between polysemous 
terms, which are troublesome for mainstream semanticists, and ambiguous terms, 
which are not troublesome, is misrepresented by this use of terminology. The 
substantive reason for my usage here is that lexical fl exibility is a property that 
applies rather broadly, and manifests with different semantic behavior in different 
contexts, two of which I discuss here. However, the explanation for the various 
manifestations of polysemy can be unifi ed by internalist proposals (Pietroski 2005: 
§3.2). See also Pietroski (forthcoming). Lastly, my usage does not ignore the role 
of pragmatics in understanding the import of the examples presented below, but 
rather insists that the phenomena to be explained are semantic (as suggested by the 
discussion in §4.1).
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well-behaved suggests that the semantic relationship between uses of 
‘book’ is of a different sort:
 (12) a. This book, which John wrote, is fi ve pounds.
   b. John wrote a book, this is it, and this book is fi v e pounds.
   c. John wrote a booka, this is it, and this bookc weighs fi ve 
      pounds.
 (13) a. This trunk, which  Jumbo grew, is full of clothes.
   b. Jumbo grew a trunk, this is it, and this trunk is full o f 
      clothes.
   c. Jumbo grew a trunke, this is it, and this trunkl is full of
      clothes.
The expression in (12a) is  (roughly) synonymous with (12b), using ‘book’ 
in the two distinct ways discussed, as refl ected in (12c). But (13a) is not 
synonymous with (13b), at least not if we interpret (13b) as making use 
of both lexical expressions of ‘trunk’ as in (13c). They are synonymous 
if we imagine Jumbo’s nose full of textiles, but this interpretation is 
not available for (13c). Importantly, this difference is not attributable 
to the syntax of these various phrases, as (12a) and (13a) appear in the 
same syntactic frames.
That these two expressions (‘book’ and ‘trunk’) behave in semanti-
cally disparate ways in relative clause constructions counts against a 
semantics that treats them as formally similar. That is, this behavior 
suggests that we do not treat the relationship between uses of ‘book’ as 
ambiguity (i.e., homophony). As Chomsky concludes:
Thus [in cases like ‘book’] we have a single formal element with a fi xed 
range of meaning, and relativization is possible, despite the shift of sense. 
But in the case of …[‘trunk’] (idiosyncratic ambiguity) we have two formal 
elements …with the same phonetic form. (Chomsky 1977)
In cases like ‘book’, the lexical entry has a range of interpretations, 
exhibiting a fl exibility that permits a kind of mixed use as in (12a). In 
cases like ‘trunk’ there are two lexical entries that are homophonous, 
each with distinct and unrelated meanings, rendering mixed use inter-
pretations of expressions like (13a) unavailable. The trenchant point 
is that the fl exibility exhibited by ‘book’ is pervasive in natural lan-
guages, and poorly captured by theories that treat them as cases of 
homophony (as seemingly EM theories must).25
There are two kinds of fl exibility explored in the remainder of this 
section, one based on non-linguistic knowledge, and one based on on-
tological type. The truth-conditions for some natural language expres-
sions are not determined by the referents of their constituents, and 
the manner of their composition. To determine their truth-conditions, 
competent language users must deploy non-linguistic knowledge of 
a general sort—too general to be considered the semantic context of 
utterance. The second sort of fl exibility permits expressions that ap-
25 As a limiting case of this strategy, which treats color terms as massively 
homophonous at the granularity of use, see Rothschild & Segal (2009).
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ply multiple predicates of different types to a single noun phrase. The 
would-be externalist meanings of such expressions require objects of 
a(n) (impossibly) bizarre sort.
4.2.1. No n-linguistic Knowledge
Consider the following expressions:
 (14) Football games are played by jerks.
 (15) Residential houses are robbed by jerks.
Sentences like (14) and (15) highlight the fact that we bring extra-lin-
guistic knowledge to bear on linguistic expressions in determining the 
truth-conditions for sentences. The information contained in the lin-
guistic properties of expressions like these (even when combined with 
their semantic contexts) do not determine the truth-conditions of those 
expressions. As such, meanings cannot be (or cannot determine) truth-
conditions, and thereby cannot be externalist.
On any EM theory the difference in the truth-conditions of any two 
sentences (modulo semantic context) must be a consequence of the 
difference in either their constituents or the manner in which those 
constituents are syntactically related. So, given that (14) and (15) 
appear in the same syntactic frames, and that they differ only with 
regard to the two constituents ‘football-games’/‘playing’ and ‘residen-
tial-houses’/‘robbed’ respectively, whatever (14) indicates is true of the 
relationship between football-games, playing, and jerks should, accord-
ing to (15), hold true for residential-houses, robbing, and jerks.26
However, the expression in (14) means that every27 football game is 
played by jerks, while the expression in (15) emphatically does not mean 
that every house is robbed by jerks. The information essential for deriv-
ing the truth-conditions for (14) involves the tight relationship between 
games and playing, namely that there can be no unplayed game—a 
relationship that does not hold between houses and robbing. But this 
information is not a linguistic property of the expression, and not part 
of the linguistic meaning of the expression. Thus in deriving the truth-
conditions for (14) a competent speaker of English relies on information 
not present in the expression (nor even the semantic context). If mean-
ings are (or determine) truth-conditions, then the truth-conditions of 
any meaningful sentence will be determined by the expression alone. 
But such a theory will fail to explain the differences in meaning be-
tween (14) and (15) not captured by the difference in their constituency.
26 See Chomsky (1975) for similar examples.
27 Admittedly, these expressions are generics, and speaker judgments in this 
domain are (seemingly) not concordant. However, even if the expression in (14) is 
not interpreted with a universal quantifi er, (14) indicates (at a minimum) that most 
football games are played by unsavory individuals. In contrast, (nearly) no one will 
interpret (15) as indicating that most residential homes are robbed, even if most of 
those robberies are perpetrated by jerks. Since this difference is not syntactic, the 
externalist is burdened to explain why the relationship between the VPs and the 
NPs in these two expressions is different.
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This general phenomenon is not limited to generic expressions. We 
bring non-linguistic knowledge to bear on linguistic expressions in oth-
er ways that do not seem to rise to the level of pragmatic inferences, 
but are also not a function of semantic context. The differing contri-
bution of expressions like ‘coffee’ as a predicate in ‘coffee drink’ and 
‘coffee grinder’ present a prima facie problem for the externalist. If the 
semantic contribution of an expression can be recovered by the seman-
tic contribution of its constituents (plus the means of their composi-
tion) the meaning of ‘coffee’ in these expressions should make the same 
contribution across uses. But a coffee drink is one that is composed of 
coffee, while a coffee grinder is not made up of coffee at all. While these 
are facts that any theory of meaning needs to explain, the externalist 
will have particular diffi culty dealing with this problem, insofar as the 
contribution of ‘coffee’ on such a theory is exhausted by its reference to 
a property—and in particular, a property instantiated by the indicated 
objects in the various expressions in which it functions as a predicate. 
But there seems to be no obvious single candidate for the needed prop-
erty in this coffee-case. The best candidate properties for the would-be 
denotations of ‘coffee’ in these two expressions seem profoundly differ-
ent: being-composed-of-coffee and used-in-the-production-of-coffee. The 
diffi cult task for the externalist is not only in pinpointing the relevant 
single property in such cases, but also in constructing an account of 
how speakers come to triangulate on such (non-obvious) properties in 
the many cases that exhibit these features (e.g. ‘metal shears’, ‘home 
loan[/inspection]’, ‘rain delay[/coat]’, ‘blue marker’, etc.). This phenom-
enon is pervasive in natural language, and not easily explained by the 
externalist.
4.2.2. On tology and Satisfaction
The lexical fl exibility exhibited by natural language expressions cannot 
be accounted for by an EM theory that demands that the meanings of 
expressions determine a unique referent, as a mind-independent ob-
ject. Consider the following two English expressions
 (16) The Hirshhorn-Museum is bankrupt.
 (17) The Hirshhorn-Museum is a cylinder.
A competent speaker of English could think that  these expressions are 
true. An EM theory accounts for this fact by indicating that such a 
speaker takes the following conditions to hold in the world: 1) there 
is an object, the one ‘Hirshhorn-Museum’ denotes, which satisfi es the 
conditions for ‘is bankrupt’; and 2) there is an object, the one ‘Hirsh-
horn-Museum’ denotes, which satisfi es the conditions for ‘is a cylinder’. 
This would require that there is some single object, denoted by ‘Hirsh-
horn-Museum’, that can be both bankrupt and a cylinder.
The predicate in (16) requires that this object be a fi nancial institu-
tion, understood through an array of socio-economic notions. Whatever 
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these notions demand about the nature of fi nancial institutions, be 
they collections of individuals or something more abstract, such ob-
jects do not seem to have a shape. Similarly, the kind of object that 
would satisfy the predicate in (17), in this case a building, is seemingly 
not the sort of thing that can have fi nancial troubles. Building projects 
can have fi scal crises, but buildings seemingly cannot. The EM theorist 
then either owes us an account of the kind of object that can satisfy the 
predicates in both (16) and (17), or they must explain why this problem 
does not generate in the fi rst place.
Taking the latter strategy, an EM theorist might appeal to the pres-
ence of ambiguity in natural languages, as in the following:
 (18) The geese are by the bank.
The expression in (18) is ambiguous. M uch like we saw with ‘trunk’ 
earlier, we can treat ‘bank’ as homphonous, indicating the distinct lexi-
cal items ‘bankf and ‘bankr’. The ambiguity of (18) is then explained 
by appeal to the homophony of these two distinct lexical items. The 
expression in (18) simply fails to determine which ‘bank’ is being used, 
and as such the expression can have different meanings based on which 
item is intended.
Likewise, one could argue that we really have two lexical entries 
for ‘Hirshhorn-Museum’, one that denotes the institution, and another 
that denotes a building. We can represent this difference between (16) 
and (17) as
 (16) The Hirshhorn-Museumf is bankrupt.
 (17) The Hirshhorn-Museumb is a cylinder.
Since ‘Hirshhorn-Museum’ identifi es two distinct (though homopho-
nous) lexical items, contextual information determines which item is 
used in (16) and (17) respectively, preserving the distinct meanings of 
the expressions, while assuaging the worry that an EM semantics re-
quires a single (metaphysically suspect) referent for the DPs in the two 
expressions. So, the externalist might insist, there need not be some 
single object that satisfi es ‘is bankrupt’ and ‘is a cylinder’, since ‘Hirsh-
horn-Museumf ’ and ‘Hirshhorn-Museumb’ denote different objects.
But this reply will not do. The same speaker that endorses (16) and 
(17) would also endorse the following:
 (19) The Hirshhorn-Museum is bankrupt and it is a cylinder.
Whatever the technical details are that govern anaphoric meanings, 
‘it’ in (19) must der ive its meaning and referent from ‘Hirshhorn-Mu-
seum’. Whichever lexical entry the context might supply (‘Hirshhorn-
Museumf ’ or ‘Hirshhorn-Museumb’) the meaning of the anaphoric ‘it’ is 
exhausted by the referent of whichever lexical item is demanded by the 
context. Thus, for the EM theorist to explain how competent speakers 
treat (16)–(19), there must be some single worldly object that is both 
a cylinder and bankrupt. So even if we grant the EM theorist his ho-
mophonous response, the ontological concern remains.
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Pietroski (2005) also notes that while a natural language speaker 
could endorse expressions like (16)–(19), the sentence in (20) is strange 
in a way (19) is not:
 (20) # The Hirshhorn-Museum is a bankrupt cylinder.
The oddity of (20) in conjunction with the acceptability of (19) (and the 
pletho ra of sentences like them) is unexplained by a semantics that 
treats meanings as determining truth-conditions. On any EM theory, 
the way the world would have to be in order for (19) to be true would 
also make (20) true: there is some object, the referent of ‘Hirshhorn-
Museum’ that is both bankrupt and is a cylinder.28 Insofar as satisfi ers 
of mutually binding predicates of different ontological types are absent 
from the domain of worldly objects, this speaks against EM theories of 
natural language meanings that require them.
But, the Realist might bite this bullet, as some semanticists do 
(see Ludlow, 2003, 2011). They might just stipulate that the domain 
contains objects that are at once both concrete and abstract. However, 
this bullet biting is both unmotivated by the externalist argument, and 
tastes far worse than the Realist might suspect. The externalist hy-
pothesis contends that, given the pedestrian objects of the world like 
chairs and rabbits—objects that we have good antecedent reasons to 
posit—a theory of meaning can be developed given only this domain 
of pre-theoretically plausible things. The externalist proposal is that 
natural language meanings can be rendered comprehensible without 
appeal to the mysterious existence of things like Sinne. Thus, the the-
ory garners intuitive support because we are not forced to accept into 
our domain a vast hierarchy of bizarre objects, like Sinne.
In this light, the Realist’s bullet biting is quite strange.29 As a means 
of avoiding the troubling consequences of viewing meanings as myste-
28 While concatenating predicates does not always yield an expression with the 
same meaning as conjoining them, this does not seem like such a case. Consider:
(1) This is a fake diamond.
(2) This is fake.
(3) This is a diamond.
While (1) implies (2), it does no t entail  (3)—in fact (3) must be false if (1) is true. 
This and other examples are problematic for straightforward applications of 
concatenating predicates, but the diffi culty here is not an ontological one. The sort of 
objects that satisfy ‘is a diamond’ can also satisfy ‘is fake’—namely physical objects.
29 Famously, Lewis (1986) argues that our best semantics for modal expressions 
posits a vast plenitude of extant possible concrete particulars that stand in spatio-
temporal relations to form possible worlds. The argument on offer contends that 
these proliferate posits are necessary because the cost of failing to accept these 
concrete possibilia are outweighed by the theoretical benefi ts they confer. But, this 
strategy is often misconstrued. These possibilia are not objects we merely discover in 
the process of analyzing meanings. Our use of modal expressions in natural language 
reveals a commitment on behalf of the natural language speaker to the existence of 
possibilia (concrete or otherwise) only if one assumes an externalist semantics. As 
Ludlow rightly states,
…ontology is tied to the demands of our scientifi c theory of the semantics of 
natural language, and not the kinds of entities and objects that members of a 
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rious Sinne, the Realist accepts the existence of hybrid abstract-con-
creta (concrete-abstracta?), trading the mysterious for the bizarre. The 
further point is that in accepting the existence of ontologically bizarre 
hybrid objects, the Realist is not merely acknowledging the ontological 
entailments of natural language usage. Rather, she is making a predic-
tion about the kinds of things we should expect to fi nd in the domain, 
if the externalist hypothesis is correct. In the absence of any pre-the-
orectical evidence that there are such things, she bears the burden of 
providing a good reason for believing that such things exist, beyond the 
fact that their existence supports her hypothesis.
Notice too, that the nature of these bizarre objects is distinct from 
those typically associated with Chomskyan critiques of externalism. 
Unlike ‘fl aws’ (Chomsky 1981), or ‘the average man’ (Hornstein 1984) 
the objects needed to satisfy expressions like (19) are not simply ab-
stracta developed for the purposes of scientifi c theorizing (Ludlow 2011: 
135–136) intricately characterized by novel logics (Kennedy & Stanley 
2009). Whatever abstract-concreta are, they are far less familiar than 
mere abstractions, and should be less palatable to the externalist.
But maybe our dislike for the bizarre is unwarranted, based on some 
vestigial aspect of our human conceptual machinery. Maybe these ab-
stract-concreta exist, happily residing in the domain and validating the 
Realist’s predictions. Or maybe hybrid objects are more palpable than 
Sinne.30 The Realist’s perverse predictions, however, do not end there. 
The externalist hypothesis predicts the existence of other hybrids, in-
cluding hybrid properties, and relations given the lexical fl exibility of 
expressions like ‘bilingual’, ‘lost’, and ‘defeat’.
In a conversation about the ability to acquire a second natural lan-
guage, one might use the following English expressions:
particular culture might believe in (Ludlow 2011: 142).
To engage in the latter kind of investigation is to do psychology. But, the Realist is 
investigating the structure of the world, not the structure of our minds. As such, 
to indicate that the theory demands certain metaphysical posits is a burden the 
theory has to bear, not an analytic consequence of the fact that linguistic expressions 
have meanings. If (ε ) is true, then there are such things as concrete possibilia. 
In this vein, some argue that we need even more things: situations (Barwise & 
Perry 1983), perspectives (Schein 2002), modes of presentation (Ludlow 1995), 
and fi ctional objects (Thomasson 1999). But we only need these things if the best 
theory of meaning is externalist—a fortiori that the theory requires a domain with 
such things counts against the merits of the theory. Adding to this list of posits the 
abstract-concreta required to address lexical fl exibility, the class of entities required 
to support the externalist hypothesis looks less and less like the pedestrian objects 
of everyday experience. Concomitantly, the externalist hypothesis looks less like a 
plausible theory that makes use of the everyday objects we are familiar with, and 
more like a theory with implausible commitments.
30 Notice how this vein of reply assumes a false dichotomy, that one either accepts 
mysterious, reifi ed meanings as things, or accepts whatever things an externalist 
semantics requires. For other alternatives again see Hinzen (2007); Hinzen (2014); 
Pietroski (2005); Pietroski (2008); Pietroski (2010); Pietroski (forthcoming).
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 (21) The child is bilingual.
 (22) John is bilingual.
Likewise, one could (roughly) c onjoin the meanings of these two expres-
sions into a single sentence using either of the following acceptable 
expressions:
 (23) The child is bilingual and so is John.
 (24) The child and John are bilingual.
Of course, an externalist semanti cs can accommodate the meanings of 
these expressions, whereby their truth-conditions are satisfi ed just in 
case there is a (salient) child, a John, and both of them instantiate the 
same particular property. To put the matter somewhat formally, (23) 
and (24) are true just in case:
 (24) ιx. ∃y. CHILD(x) & JOHN(y) & BILINGUAL(x) & BILINGUAL(y)
In the expressions (21)–(24), the expression ‘bilingual’ has a single, uni-
vocal meaning, as refl ected in the single truth-conditional predicate 
‘BILINGUAL’. For the externalist this identifi es some single property, say 
the property had by all things that acquire/speak/know two languages. 
As such the sentences in (21)–(24) are well captured by an externalist 
semantics.
But ‘bilingual’ is lexically fl exible. While walking the streets of Lon-
don, Ontario, Canada, I came across an empty box outside a franchise 
sandwich shop. Printed on the outside of this box was the expression 
‘bilingual napkins’ which presumably identifi ed the box’s contents as 
napkins on which information is printed in two different languages. 
Sitting in this franchise with a group of friends, and noticing the fea-
tures of one such napkin, a competent speaker could well say to their 
compatriots the following acceptable sentence:
 (25) The napkin is bilingual.
Supposing this group also knew our bilingual friend John, a compete nt 
speaker could say, and the group would no doubt accept as true, the 
following acceptable expression:
 (26) The napkin is bilingual and so is John.
However, the following truth-conditions, which for the externalist are 
determined  by the meaning of (26) are not satisfi ed in this situation:
 (26) ιx. ∃y. NAPKIN(x) & JOHN(y) & BILINGUAL(x) & BILINGUAL(y)
Since both bilingual predicates in (26) are derived from the single use of 
‘bilingual’ in (26), they must have the same truth-conditions. As such, for 
the externalist they must pick out the very same property. If that prop-
erty pertains to the acquisition of multiple languages, the napkin clearly 
fails to instantiate such a property. And if the property pertains to the 
kinds of orthography printed on a thing’s exterior, John does not count 
as having such features. For the externalist, (26) turns out to be false in 
the situation described—the same situation that makes both (22) and 
(25) true. Given that (26), on an externalist semantics, has the meaning 
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attained by conjoining (22) and (25) (as indicated by the relationship 
between (21)–(23)), externalism should predict that competent speakers 
accept that (26) is true. That it does not is a problem for EM theories.
As before, the externalist could claim that ‘bilingual’ is hompho-
nous, with two lexical entries ‘bilinguala’ and ‘bilingualo’ pertaining to 
the aforementioned acquisitional and orthographic properties (respec-
tively). But just as in the example with ‘the Hirshhorn Museum’, this 
reply will not do. Whichever lexical entry the context demands, the 
truth-conditional predicates in (26) will have the same satisfaction 
conditions as each other. The ‘bilinguala’ interpretation of these predi-
cates leaves the fi rst unsatisfi ed by the napkin, while the ‘bilingualo’ 
interpretation leaves the second unsatisfi ed by John. Either way, ex-
ternalism makes the wrong prediction that, relativized to the situation, 
(26) is (treated as) false (by competent speakers). The externalist’s re-
maining response is to accept that there is some single bizarre, hybrid 
(or multifarious) property that admits to having shifting satisfaction 
conditions within a single context.
As with the case involving the fl exibility of ‘the Hirshhorn-Muse-
um’, the Realist could bite this bullet. She can simply accept that the 
domain contains not only hybrid abstract-concreta, but also hybrid 
properties such that the very same property can be instantiated in dis-
tinct ways by disparate objects within the same context.31 But again, 
as with ‘the Hirshhorn-Museum’, even this (bizarre) concession fails 
to explain the distribution of competent speaker judgments. Consider
 (26) The napkin is bilingual and so is John.
 (27) # The napkin and John are bilingual.
The expression in (27) is strange in a way that (26) is not. This strange-
ness, w hatever it amounts to, seems to be a fact about the meanings of 
the constituent expressions of the sentence, since there is no general pro-
hibition against joint predication (as exemplifi ed in (24)). The syntactic 
frames of (23) and (24) are repeated in (26) and (27), yet the latter do not 
bear the same semantic relations to one another as the former, insofar as 
they are not synonymous (as should be clear by the oddity of (27)).
31 To be clear, this is not an injunction against multiple realizability. To take the 
paradigm case, mental properties like belief can be realized in Martian brains just as 
well as human ones. But what is instantiated in these distinct organisms is (say) an 
entity that plays a particular functional role in the mind of the organism, and indeed 
the same functional role. The worry here is not that the napkin and John embody 
different ways of instantiating the same property, but that they instantiate different 
properties. Contrast this difference with the manner in which distinct humans are 
bilingual. John Kerry and Nicolas Sarkozy are both bilingual (let’s suppose), yet the 
bilingual property is realized in their person in distinct ways. At the very least they 
differ regarding the languages in which they are fl uent: Kerry is fl uent in English 
and French, while Sarkozy is fl uent in French and German. The manner in which 
Kerry and Sarkozy differ is quite clearly not the manner in which John and the 
napkin differ regarding bilingualism.
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The externalist, and the Realist, in order to explain the distribution 
of competent speaker judgments for sentences containing nouns like 
‘the Hirshhorn Museum’ and predicates like ‘bilingual’ are compelled to 
accept some rather bizarre entities into the domain of worldly things: 
hybrid objects that exhibit a concrete-abstract duality, and properties 
that have varying conditions for instantiation across instances within a 
single context. Neither of these concessions seems pleasant. Worse yet, 
conceding in these ways still leave unexplained aspects of competent 
speakers’ judgments, as can be seen by the contrast between (26) and 
(27).
Finally, consider the following:
 (28) Henry lost his key, his lawsuit, and his job.
One can easily imagine a situation in which (28) is deemed both felici-
tous and true by co mpetent speakers, whereby Henry’s misplacing his 
car key made him late to the courthouse, which led to his termination. 
Yet, Henry stands in very different relations to these three objects, all 
of which are expressed by the single use of ‘lost’ in the sentence. Henry 
is no longer in possession of his key, while his lawsuit, as a complex 
activity he participated in, has met with a particular conclusion. And 
of course, Henry no longer has a job in that a contract he had with 
some unmentioned individual is no longer binding. On an externalist 
account the worldly relation that ‘lost’ denotes requires that all three 
objects, abstract and concrete alike, must (when paired with Henry) 
satisfy that relation, despite these differences. And as with our previ-
ous examples, an appeal to ambiguity is not available to the external-
ist.
Let’s not forget that examples of this sort are numerous:
 (29) The chef's kitchen ran better than an imported car.
 (30) Napoleon’s defeat was worse than Kasparov’s.
Given the acceptability of sentences like these, expressions like ‘lost’, 
‘run’ and ‘defeat’ seem to exhibit lexical fl exibility as well. If the Realist 
is forced to accept the existence of hybrid relations as a result of such 
fl exibility, the pedestrian nature of the objects needed to accomplish 
the externalist’s aims is substantively undermined—especially if this 
bizarre ontology remains insuffi ciently explanatory. The point worth 
underscoring here is that the examples explored in this section are not 
isolated aberrations in a language that is otherwise well-modeled by 
externalism. Lexical fl exibility is rampant in natural language expres-
sions. To account for the manner in which natural language speak-
ers treat these expressions, the externalist is compelled to accept into 
her ontology metaphysically bizarre objects, properties, and relations. 
Rather than viewing these ontological commitments as the price to be 
paid for an adequate theory of meaning, such requirements might be 
better seen, or so I contend, as a reductio against the externalist hy-
pothesis that requires them.
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4.3. An Externalist Reply
The externalist might reply to these worries by leveraging the purport-
ed virtues of an externalist semantics. She might contend that even if 
the fl exibility cases rehearsed above require that she bear an ontological 
burden, such burden bearing is better than the alternative. As a part 
of an overall externalist theory, the virtues of the theory far outweigh 
these burdens. One principal virtue that supporters of externalism 
might trumpet is that understanding meanings in this way uniquely 
preserves semanticists’ main source of linguistic data, the truth-value 
judgments of competent speakers. To quote a prominent externalist:
In short, intuitions about the truth and falsity of what is said by utterances 
of sentences have formed the data by which theorists have tested their hy-
potheses about meaning. There is no other obvious source of native speaker 
intuitions that are related to meaning. So if we did not have robust intu-
itions about the truth-conditions of our utterances, it would not be clear how 
to test such hypotheses; there would be no fi rm basis on which to construct 
a theory of meaning. (Stanley 2007: 6)
Consider for example, the landmark insight of Davidson (1967b) in 
treating the logical form of action sentences as involving quantifi cation 
over events. The sentences in (31) display a particular pattern of infer-
ence, as indicated in Figure 1, wherein the arrows represent the direc-
tion of inferences that speakers of English are apt to make.
 (31) a. Brutus stabbed Caesar slowly and skillfully.
   b. Brutus stabbed Caesar slowly.
   c. Brutus stabbed Caesar skillfully.
   d. Brutus stabbed Caesar.
Davidson’s proposal aims to capture these patterns of inference. Pro-
posing that the logical forms in (31) are indicative of the truth-condi-
tions of the sentences in (31), this approach captures the inferential 
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judgments of English speakers, by modeling these inferences as logical 
entailment.
 (31) a. ∃e[STAB(e,Brutus,Caesar) & SLOW(e) & SK ILL(e)]
     b. ∃e[STAB(e,Brutus,Caesar) & SLOW(e)]
     c. ∃e[STAB(e,Brutus,Caesar) & SKILL(e)]
     d. ∃e[STAB(e,Brutus,Caesar)]
Because the proposed logical forms for the expressions in (31) quantify 
over events, the expression in (31a) entails the other expressions in 
(31) by way of conjunction reduction. As such, the “diamond-shaped” 
inference patterns of speakers are captured by an externalist theory 
that takes events as the worldly-satisfi ers of expressions.
This reasoning, contends the externalist, only makes sense if the 
explanada of the hypothesis are the inferential judgments of speakers, 
as judgments about the concomitant truth of collections of sentences. 
Thus the purported justifi cation for an externalist semantics is that it 
maintains the theoretical import of speaker judgments. To deny that 
sentences have externalist meanings is to deny the connection between 
meaning and truth that renders these judgments worthy of capture. In 
this manner the externalist might contend, if meanings have nothing 
to do with truth, then these truth-value judgments are not indicative of 
expression meanings and of no use for semantic investigation.
However, denying the externalist thesis (ε ) does not also require 
denying that the truth-value judgments of speakers are relevant data 
for the purposes of semantic theorizing. Externalists are committed 
to a particular relationship between truth and meaning—namely the 
one codifi ed in (ε ). In denying this, a semanticist need not deny that 
meaning is related to truth. She must simply deny that meanings de-
termine truth-conditions. One can hold that natural language speakers 
can use sentences to make utterances that are true, and still deny the 
externalist thesis. And this can be done without denying that there is 
some “systematic” manner in which meaning is related to truth (pace 
Stanley 2007: 8). Such a view merely holds that the systematic manner 
in which linguistic meaning relates to the external world involves the 
interaction of multiple non-linguistic cognitive and external systems 
that connect in complex ways. This complexity might be systematic, 
but because many of the systems involved are extra-linguistic (and not 
semantic) the meaning of an expression will not, in the absence of this 
complex interaction, determine its truth-conditions.
One can, as Stanley does, amalgamate this motley group of dispa-
rate non-linguistic systems32 under the term ‘context’. And if by ‘con-
32 The diversity of components that collectively make up the “context” of an 
utterance, so construed, is important to note. Shared human systems that recognize 
gaze following, emotional facial gestures, object detection, agency detection, and 
many others, not to mention the external physical systems that govern “normal” 
visual and auditory environments, all fall under the “context” that determinately 
links meanings to truth. But if one wants to know how meanings differentially 
interact with these various systems in order for a speaker to utter something true, 
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text’ one includes whatever is needed to derive truth-conditions from 
meanings, then trivially the meaning of an expression (plus the “con-
text” of its use) determines its truth-conditions. But, the gap between 
what a sentence means and what a speaker communicates in convey-
ing that meaning via a linguistic utterance admits to some marked 
complexity—as noted in §4.1. Respecting, and not merely masking, the 
complexity of this relationship between the meaning of a sentence and 
the truth of an utterance not only preserves the (nuanced) use of truth-
value judgments as linguistic data, but it opens up new sources of data 
(Pietroski et al. 2009; Lidz et al. 2011; Vogel et al. 2014). So, far from 
making the semanticist’s task impossible (or without basis) denying (ε ) 
expands the data-set for the theoretician, while preserving the utility 
(though augmenting the informativeness) of speaker judgments.
5. Mental Content
In the previous two sections we saw arguments that highlight the dif-
fi culty in accepting externalist accounts of language (EL views), and 
externalist theories of meaning (EM views). Arguments against an 
EL view push an externalist to adopt externalist views about mental 
content. If languages are not external objects, but rather aspects of 
the human mind/brain, then to rescue the EM view an externalist is 
committed to the view that the content of mental representations can 
be characterized externally, as relations between representations (or 
concepts) and worldly objects. As such, some arguments for internal-
ism address both externalist theories about mental content, and the 
relationship between mental content and linguistic meaning. In this 
section I present these concerns.
5.1. Naturalist Theories of Content
Both sentences and thoughts seem to be about the world, and thereby 
exhibit intentionality. The close proximity of these disciplines gives 
rise to a simple solution to the problem of intentionality for language. 
Namely, that the problem of intentionality is solved at the level of 
thought, not language. An enticing view about the relationship be-
tween thought and language is that the contents and structure of our 
thoughts are merely mirrored in language. If the structure of natural 
language mirrors the structure of thought, wherein an expression in 
a language is merely a way of making public some particular thought 
composed of conceptual content, then the intentionality (and meaning) 
of an expression simply tracks that of the concepts used to compose 
the expressed thought. On such a view, natural language expressions 
are merely labels for thoughts, and likewise, words are merely labels 
abstracting over these differences by indicating that the context somehow fi lls this 
gap is no answer at all. Worse yet, it commits one to a theory of meaning that is 
thereby incapable of addressing such questions.
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for concepts, as a way of making them articulable. Call this the label 
theory of linguistic meaning.33
So long as the language I speak syntactically composes in a way 
commensurate with the structure of my thoughts, linguistic meaning 
would perfectly mirror conceptual content. On this proposal, the mean-
ings of our expressions would hook up with the world via conceptual 
content, so long as conceptual content can be characterized externally. 
So, to the degree that our concepts align with the “fi ne structure” of the 
world, expressions of a natural language will likewise accord with the 
mind external objects of the world.
But why should one insist that linguistic meaning is mediated by 
our conceptual system? For one, this answers the problem of intention-
ality at the level of language. But more importantly for the Realist, 
the desire here relates to naturalistic explanation. As we saw, a sub-
stantive source of contention in thinking about linguistic meaning as 
externalist relates to the aims of the scientifi c enterprise of linguistics. 
Facts about the acquisition and productivity of language in humans de-
serve explanation, and a theory of meaning ought to add to (or at least 
make possible) an explanation of these facts. As we saw in §3.1 these 
considerations strongly suggest that the object of study for a natural-
istic investigation of language is in the mind. As such, to the degree 
one thinks that language and thought are independent, a naturalistic 
inquiry into these matters will address the way in which these distinct 
mental faculties interact.
There is no shortage of literature addressing the viability of natu-
ralistic accounts of content.34 Whether or not naturalistic accounts of 
intentionality are viable is beyond the scope of this work, but the point 
I want to emphasize here is that the force of the arguments presented 
so far against externalism compel the externalist to adopt two conten-
tious views: a labeling theory of linguistic meaning, and a naturalistic 
account of intentionality. I’ll not take the time to illustrate the conten-
tiousness of the latter,35 but the former position is worth analyzing, in 
part because so many philosophers seem to adopt this view without 
much defense.
33 Fodor (1975) seems to hold this view. Jackendoff (2002) explicitly adopts this 
position, though not by this name. Oddly enough he defends an internalist proposal 
for linguistic meaning on the basis that no naturalistic account of external mental 
content is plausible.
34 For a good survey see the introduction to Macdonald & Papineau (2006).
35 This has been done by many, and better than I could hope to do here. See 
Jackendoff (2002); Loewer (1997); Boghossian (1991); Godfrey-Smith (1989); and 
McGinn (1982).
 C. A. Vogel, Lexical Flexibility, Natural Language, and Ontology 31
5.2. Labeling Theory of Meaning
The labeling theory of meaning views the relationship between words 
and concepts as one of labeling, whereby words are like labels for con-
cepts. My use of ‘cat’ is just a way of tokening the CAT concept in my 
audience, whose content serves as the meaning of ‘cat’ in any expres-
sion that uses it, like ‘The cat is on the mat’. Linguistic meaning on this 
view is just conceptual content. Such a view (as indicated above) can 
still be meaningfully externalist, if the contents of our concepts are ex-
ternalist. This labeling view is pervasive amongst philosophers. In fact, 
the view is often adopted as obvious, without much need to articulate 
that indeed adopting the view embodies a collection of commitments 
about the relationship between the human language faculty and the 
conceptual system. Burge (1975) is a paradigmatic example. In discuss-
ing the expansiveness of his famous ‘arthritis’ case, Burge writes:
On the other hand, the [arthritis] thought experiment does appear to de-
pend on the possibility of someone’s having a propositional attitude despite 
an incomplete mastery of some notion in its content …Suppose a subject 
thinks falsely that all swans are white …that ‘swan’ means ‘white swan’ 
(Burge 1975: 83) (my emphasis)36
Burge treats the content of a concept, or notion, which plays an impor-
tant role in determining the content of the propositional attitude some-
one might hold, as no different than the meaning of a natural language 
word: hence the notion SWAN has the same meaning as ‘swan’. In his 
book-length critique of Burge’s account of wide-content Segal (2000) 
commits to this same theory about the relationship of words to concepts.
Zowie and Twin Zowie both say “My engagement ring is studded with dia-
monds.” Are the concepts expressed by their words “diamond” the same? 
(Segal, 2000, p. 6)
…
• Let w be the focal word
• Let c be the concept [the subject] expresses by w.
      (Segal 2000: 67)
In more contemporary literature, Weber (2005) writes
The meaning of the term “gene” has changed several times in the history 
of twentieth-century genetics. If we distinguish between a term’s sense and 
its reference, it is possible that the term’s sense has changed, but not it’s 
reference…I have examined both the reference potential and the reference 
connected with different historical versions of the gene concept. (my empha-
sis) (Weber 2005: 228)
As a fi nal example, consider this passage from Clark & Chalmers 
(1998), wherein they discuss an opponent’s (possible) response to their 
thought experiment involving Otto, and his purported belief about the 
location of a museum:
36 Here Burge uses ‘notion’ as a way of talking about the content of a concept: 
“Talk of notions is roughly similar to talk of concepts in an informal sense”(Burge 
1975: 83).
32 C. A. Vogel, Lexical Flexibility, Natural Language, and Ontology
An opponent might put her foot down and insist that as she uses the term 
‘belief ’, or perhaps even according to standard usage, Otto simply does not 
qualify as believing that the museum is on 53rd street. We do not intend to 
debate standard usage; our broader point is that the notion of belief…(my 
emphasis) (Clark & Chalmers 1998: 14)
Here the slide from the meanings of a linguistic expression ‘belief ’ (as 
evident in its “standard” usage) to the concept (or notion) of belief, is 
clear, blatant, and offered without explanation or defense.
Linguistic meaning, on this often assumed view, is simply concep-
tual meaning. But this view has the following consequences: fi rst, the 
extension of our words must have the same extension as their underly-
ing conceptual meanings, and second, the syntax of natural language 
must be mirrored in the composition of thought. Neither of these con-
sequences seem well supported by the way natural language speakers 
treat the meanings of expressions.
The fl exibility of natural language expressions speaks against the 
fi rst consequence.
 (19) The Hirshhorn-Museum is bankrupt and it is a cylinder.
If the extension of the concept HIRSHHORN-MUSEUM is to capture the 
meanings that natural language users apply to the term ‘Hirshhorn-
Museum’ then the extension of the concept better include both the con-
crete building that houses artworks, and the abstract institution that 
employs hundreds of people. As we’ve seen, many natural language ex-
pressions bear meanings that do not track the domain of objects in this 
way. Thus whatever thought corresponds to (19), and thereby stands as 
the meaning of (19), it must either treat ‘Hirshhorn-Museum’ as label-
ing two distinct concepts, or have a content such that some (abstract) 
object (or some building) is both cylindrical and bankrupt. The former 
avenue belies the manifest relationship between the uses of the Eng-
lish term, and fails to account for the felt relatedness of these uses. The 
latter option has much more bizarre metaphysical commitments, since 
we have no other reason (other than a commitment to particular views 
about semantics) to postulate such an entity.
Turning to the second consequence, if language mirrored the struc-
ture of thought, then thoughts should compose much the way expres-
sions do. More strictly, the meanings of linguistic expressions and their 
underlying logical forms should mirror the structure of the concepts 
those forms express. The deep structural syntactic frames that make 
up interpretable expressions in a natural language must mirror the 
structure of their underlying concepts. In this vein, consider the follow-
ing sentence:
 (32) Wilbur kicked Fred.
Paying attention to the syntax of this construction, and adopting the la-
beling theory commitment, we ought to conclude that the KICK concept 
is dyadic. The word ‘kicked’ in the complete expression in (32) takes a 
subject and an object, and likewise we would expect the related concept 
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to take two elements to form a complete thought. Thus the thought 
expressed must make use of a concept like:
 (33) KICK(__s,__o)
which when saturated with two elements, mak es the complete thought
 (34) KICK(Wilbur, Fred)
However, if this dyadic notion of KICK is supposed to underlie all mean-
ingful uses of ‘kick’, as implied by the labeling theory, the following 
expression is an apparent counterexample:
 (35) Wilbur kicked Fred with his foot.
Given the syntactic structure of the expression in (35), the underlying 
conceptu al meaning must have a triadic structure, to make room for 
the instrument used in the kicking:
 (36) KICK(__s,__o __i)
For any way of differentiating concepts, s urely addicity falls under the 
identity condition for a given concept. That is, concepts with differ-
ent addicities must be different concepts. So, (33) and (36) cannot be 
the same concept. As such, the meaning of ‘kicked’ in (32) and (35) is 
different on the labeling view, insofar as ‘kicked’ labels concepts that 
are (of) different (addicities). This entailment leaves unexplained why 
a competent speaker would fi nd that both (32) and (35) are felicitous 
descriptions of the same kicking.
A defender of the labeling view might hold that really we have only 
one KICK concept, with suffi cient addicity to accommodate all uses of 
‘kick’, and thereby holding their meaning constant across various uses. 
As such, the concept in (36) is the only KICK concept, made use of in ex-
pressions where the instrument of the kicking is unmentioned.
There are three problems with that response: fi rst, this requires 
that many expressions that make use of the transitive ‘kick’ have im-
plicit content of an unspoken instrument. And there seems to be no 
syntactic evidence that such expressions have any such implicit con-
tent. Second, such a triadic concept will not capture the meanings of 
expressions like
 (37) Wilbur kicked Fred the ball.
 (38) Wilbur kicked Fred the ball with his toe.
The underlying conceptual meaning for (38) must have a tetradic ad-
dicity, to make room f or the indirect and direct objects in the syntactic 
structure of the expression. Insisting here that the single conceptual 
meaning for ‘kick’ is a tetradic concept is implausible. While one might 
entertain the plausibility that transitive uses of ‘kick’ leave some un-
spoken implicit content about what instrument was used in a given 
kicking, surely such uses do not leave the existence of (nonexistent??) 
indirect objects implicit, as would be required if (39) was the underly-
ing conceptual meaning of (32).
 (39) KICK(WILBURS,FREDDO,NOTHINGIO,FOOTI)
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 (32) Wilbur kicked [nothing to] Fred [w ith his foot].
And plainly, (32) does not mean what (32) means.
The third problem for the super-addicity mo ve pushes in the oppo-
site direction. Sentences like (40) seem to require conceptual meanings 
that are monadic.
 (40) Wilbur kicked.
Insisting here that the expression in (40) really contains im plicit con-
tent that refl ects the underlying tetradic conceptual structure in (39) 
strains good explanation.
Of course, the label theorist could respond to this data by treating 
all this as evidence that there are really multiple words ‘kick’ with mul-
tiple KICK concepts as their meanings. There are, on this reply, multiple 
homophones ‘kick’ each paired with a different concept depending on 
whether they have direct objects, instruments, and/or indirect objects. 
However, such a response treats the difference between these uses of 
‘kick’ like the difference between ‘kick’ and ‘punch’—they are different 
words, with different conceptual meanings. This of course leaves un-
explained what is obvious, that the many uses of ‘kick’ describe quite 
similar actions, and are conceptually related. The events these various 
uses of ‘kick’ describe bear striking features in common—those features 
that make them plausible kickings in the fi rst place. A theory about the 
relationship between the meaning of words and the content of concepts 
that leaves such basic facts unexplained is troubled.
The point then is this: the relationship between linguistic meaning 
and conceptual content is not nearly as simple as the labeling theory 
would have it, as the case of (the addicity of) ‘kick’ and KICK shows. And 
addicity is but one feature of the relationship between lexical items 
and concepts that admits to some prima facie complexity.37 For the 
externalist, this should be troubling news, since this means that the 
path from the meaning of a term, through the content of the associated 
concept, to its worldly extension is rather complex. In short, the IL-EM 
37 Other aspects of the content of our concepts, apart from their structure, 
highlight the complex connection between words and the concepts that underwrite 
them. Consider the different ways in which the predicate ‘is blue’ applies to objects, 
and what this says about the complex application of the blue concept.
(1) The house is blue.
(2) The marker is blue.
(3) The iris is blue.
(4) The sky is blue.
Th e truth-conditions for the  color predicate in (1) that would make it tr ue of some 
house, would not, when applied to some marker, make (2) true, despite the fact 
that they appear in the same syntactic frame. So if the meaning of expressions are 
a result of the satisfaction conditions of their underlying concepts, the satisfaction 
conditions for the thoughts BLUE(HOUSE) and BLUE(MARKER) are not merely going to 
be attributable to the differences in the extension of HOUSE and MARKER—mutatis 
mutandis for (3). And while many uses of (4) are considered true by competent 
speakers, what is far from clear is which object is picked out such that it satisfi es ‘is 
blue’ in any of the ways just mentioned here.
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theorist is committed to two views about language and content that are 
contentious, one of which (given our discussion here) seems implausi-
ble. Not only are such theorists saddled with giving a suffi ciently plau-
sible naturalistic account of mental content, they are also saddled with 
the troubles articulated here for the label theory of linguistic meaning.
6. Natural Language and Ontology
The arguments thus far have been multifaceted, but direct. What they 
have shown is that externalist proposals about the nature of languages 
as objects, and about linguistic meaning—in particular (ε )—are dif-
fi cult theses to defend. In this closing section I’ll indicate how this dif-
fi culty undermines the Realist’s metaphysical methodology. Primar-
ily, if (ε ) is dubious, then appealing to the truth-conditions of natural 
language expressions, or the satisfaction conditions of their purported 
conceptual meanings, as justifi cation for metaphysical conclusions is 
without foundation.38
The problems detailed thus far for (ε ) undermine the fruitfulness 
of the Realist’s default metaphysical methodology.39 Ontological inves-
tigation proceeds by analyzing natural language usage. Roughly, the 
Realist makes use of her competence with a given natural language, 
since such competence ensures that she understands the meanings of 
natural language expressions. Under the guise that such meanings are 
externalist, she derives from them the ontology one is committed to in 
accepting the truth of a given expression. Taken together, the ontologi-
cal commitments of all the true sentences determine what there is. In 
the opening sections of this paper I sketched the Realist’s methodology. 
38 This is especially true if the human ability to construct complex thoughts from 
different conceptual domains depends on the human language faculty (Carruthers 
2002; Spelke 2003; Jackendoff 1990, 1996; Bloom 2000). Even if we grant that our 
concepts have satisfaction conditions that accord with the structure of reality, once 
those concepts are put to work by the language faculty in building meanings to 
sentences, there’s no assurance that the content of the resulting construction will 
retain such a tight connection to the world (see Glanzberg 2011). And of course 
there is no guarantee that our concepts accord with reality’s structure. The work of 
Michotte (1946 [1963]) illustrates the diffi culty of such certainty with regard to our 
judgments of causation, where clearly non-causal scenes are judged by subjects as 
exhibiting causation. A fortiori these judgments persist even when objects interact 
in ways nearly identical to clearly non-causal events (Scholl & Nakayama 2002).
39 Such a position is Realist because it holds that there is an objective structure to 
the world. However, the view is also importantly Quinean, in the sense that it adopts 
a methodology of looking to language, and to quantifi cational structure in particular, 
to settle ontological disputes. While these two positions seem interrelated, there is 
reason to think neither entails the other (Hirsch 2002). The arguments outlined 
here do not undermine Realism tout court, even if they directly undermine the 
Quinean Realist position adopted by many philosophers and metaphysicians. For 
these reasons I’ve highlighted the distinction here, though throughout the paper, I 
use ‘Realist’ and its neighboring forms as short hand for the more cumbersome and 
possibly misleading ‘Quinean Realist’
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I’ll close here with a restatement of that widely-adopted strategy and 
articulate the reasons to reconsider its merits.
In §1 we saw that the Realist holds that there is a unique language 
(an interpretation of the existential quantifi er) whose quantifi cational 
structure mirrors the structure of reality.40 Put more explicitly, Realist
…inquiry will be guided by …[an] assumption [that] modern logic’s quanti-
fi cational apparatus mirrors the structure of reality: I assume an ontology 
of things. Moreover, I assume that there is a single, objective, correct ac-
count of what things there are. (Sider 2002: xvi)
This account is captured by the meanings of expressions in (what I’ll 
call) the Language of Ontology, or LO. With this privileged language in 
hand metaphyisicans can proceed to answer ontological questions by 
investigating the meanings of expressions in that privileged language, 
which can be given by way of Tarskian satisfaction by sequences of 
domain objects. Thus the Realist holds, the objects required to account 
for the meanings of the true expressions in LO are the objects of reality, 
since this privileged language mirrors reality’s (object-based) structure.
To highlight an example of this strategy in action, consider the fol-
lowing points made by Sider (2002) in arguing against certain concep-
tions of time:
The status of tense is a second issue in the philosophy of time. Tensed sen-
tences are those which presuppose a certain position or vantage point with-
in the whole of time, for example:
 It is now raining.
 It was the case that there existed dinosaurs.
 I will one day visit Utah. (Sider 2002: 12)
In arguing against a presentist theory of time, Sider contends that 
the presentist cannot clearly account for the truth of sentences that 
(seemingly) refer to the non-present. Insofar as the presentist denies 
that there are any ontologically real past or future times, any sentence 
that requires the existence of past/future times must thereby be either 
meaningless, or simply false. Such sentences have no truth-makers 
given the presentist’s ontology, and thus the presentist cannot account 
for the truth of tensed sentences.
The success of this argument clearly presumes that the meanings of 
these natural language expressions determine their truth-conditions, 
insofar as their meaningfulness depends on the existence of past/future 
times. The presentist denies that there are past/future times. If the 
sentences Sider presents are meaningful—which they surely are, given 
that competent speakers of English have no problem understanding 
40 Sider expresses the same Realist commitment with different, less perspicuous 
language elsewhere:
Clearly there are multiple (inferentially and materially adequate) interpretations 
of quantifi ers. As I see it, the real issue is whether any of these interpretations 
is metaphysically distinguished, whether any of them uniquely matches the 
structure of the world, whether any carves nature at the joints better than the 
others. (Sider 2009: 392)
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them—then ex(ternalist) hypothesi they have truth-conditions. Those 
conditions are only satisfi ed if there is some future time where Sider is 
in Utah, and some past time where dinosaurs are alive and well. The 
presentist, contends Sider, must admit then that all tensed sentences 
are false or meaningless, since they have no temporal satisfi ers. This 
consequence thereby seems bad for the presentist.
Of course, a key step in this line of argumentation asserts the truth of 
(ε ). As we have seen, this externalist hypothesis is troubled. If the mean-
ing of tensed terms do not determine whether or not they refer to times 
(pace externalism), then the move from linguistic meaning to ontological 
commitment is without warrant. And the supposition, if not false, is (at 
least) diffi cult to defend in light of the fl exibility of natural language.
However, the Realist has a ready (and plausible) response to this 
objection. After all, natural languages like English are awash with 
vexing semantic properties like vagueness, ambiguity, and (appar-
ently) lexical fl exibility. As such, there is little surprise that they are 
ill-suited for the purposes of ontological investigation. The language 
the Realist needs is one that conforms to the features of classical logic, 
and none of these semantic properties are tolerated by such logics. But 
some languages are not defi cient in these ways—namely the languages 
invented in the process of scientifi c inquiry. On this reply, the privi-
leged language LO needed for ontological investigation is the one prof-
fered by our best sciences. After all, scientifi c inquiry is guided by the 
expressed purpose of perspicuously describing the world. This process 
involves making decisions about what terms to use. The results of such 
inquiry are languages that embody the kind of precision that natural 
languages like English lack. This embodiment makes these scientifi c 
languages better suited for ontological investigation, and thereby bet-
ter candidates for LO.
Sider himself indicates as much:
I hold that the fundamental is determinate…First, no special-purpose vo-
cabulary that is distinctive of indeterminacy …carves [nature] at the joints. 
Second, fundamental languages obey classical logic. (Sider, 2011, p. 137)
The fundamental structure of reality does not admit to the fuzziness 
typical of natural language meanings. Likewise, fundamental languag-
es, those that cleave to the structure of the world, are free of such prop-
erties. Their constituents have determinate meanings/referents. The 
privileged LO, the language that mirrors the fundamental structure 
of reality, should not admit to the kind of indeterminacy we fi nd with 
natural languages.41 Instead, this privileged language should have the 
41 Technically, LO must typify a class of languages, not a single language. 
Suppose LO contains the terms of imperial measurement. Such a language can be 
translated into one that uses a metric system. Neither language would cleave to 
realities structure any better than the other. Mutadis mutundis for the many logical 
operators. Sider’s focus is on the interpretation of the quantifi ers, and in particular, 
the existential quantifi er. On this point, all the various languages in the LO class 
would agree, for the Realist.
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semantics of a Tarskian logic, whereby domain objects constitute the 
meanings of its expressions.
According to Sider, the process of scientifi c inquiry yields languages 
of this ontologically determining sort:
We should believe generally what good theories say; so if a good theory 
makes an ontological claim, we should believe it. The ontological claim took 
part in a theoretical success, and therefore inherits a borrowed luster…
[But] the conceptual decisions …also took part in a theoretical success, and 
also inherit a borrowed luster. (Sider 2011: 12)
Sider suggests that the languages used to express our best scientifi c 
theories are better suited for questions of ontology, and that certain 
sciences do this better than others (Sider 2011: 6). The substantive as-
sumption endorsed by this Realist is that scientifi c methodology is of 
suffi cient epistemic heft that the languages our best sciences construct 
are those that match the quantifi cational structure of the world. And 
because the languages used to state our best scientifi c theories are de-
signed to perspicaciously describe the world, the epistemic credentials 
of naturalistic inquiry assures us that such languages make use of ex-
ternalist meanings. The value of this move to such languages is mea-
sured by the degree to which scientifi c methods deliver languages that 
mirror the structure of reality. I’ve argued elsewhere that this move 
might be suspect, as terms in core sciences seem to exhibit lexical fl ex-
ibility in much the way natural languages do (Vogel, under review). 
Nonetheless, the Realist that embraces this reply must thereby aban-
don the use of natural languages for the purpose of ontological investi-
gation. The very insistence that there is a distinction between natural 
and scientifi c languages (in terms of their ontological credentials) calls 
into question the use of natural language speaker judgments to adjudi-
cate ontological matters.
It’s worth noting how impactful this Realist retreat to scientifi c lan-
guages is. Much of philosophical discourse in both metaphysics proper, 
and in other philosophical domains where ontological questions seem 
to matter, relies on the use of natural language expressions, and the 
purported ontological commitments of speakers that endorse those ex-
pressions as true. The example above with tensed sentences is com-
monplace. Stotz et al. (2004) summarizes the sort of strategy philoso-
phers deploy in pursuing their metaphysical projects:
[In analyzing concepts] [t]raditionally, philosophers have relied on their 
individual linguistic competence with the corresponding words. When ana-
lyzing a concept, the philosopher treats him or herself as a sociolinguistic 
’sample of one’ Stotz et al. (2004).
This kind of Conceptual Analysis tends to proceed by offering up a short 
natural language description of a situation, and then probes whether 
or not the situation that meets the truth-conditions of the description 
also serves as a satisfi er of the term under dispute. To take an example 
of this method, consider this case from Lewis (2000) in his discussion 
about the metaphysics of causation:
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[ROCKS]
Billy and Suzy throw rocks at bottles. Suzy throws fi rst, or maybe throws 
harder. Her rock arrives fi rst. The bottle shatters. When Billy’s rock gets to 
where the bottle used to be, there is nothing but fl ying shards of glass. […] 
So Suzy’s throw causes the shattering. Billy’s doesn’t. (Lewis 2000: 184)
The familiar method used here is to present a case which makes use of 
the metaphysical notion in question, and in light of the readers’ com-
prehension of the passage, leverage their intuitive judgments about the 
described case with regard to that notion. Here, the case is presented 
to show a fl aw in a simple counterfactual notion of causation, and lend 
support to an ancestral-counterfactual account. The judgments of natu-
ral language speakers, namely that the expression ‘Billy caused the 
bottle to break’ is false, plays an evidential role in Lewis’ argument. 
This judgment is offered as evidence that the counterfactual concep-
tion of causation42 is troubled. The supposition is that the same situ-
ation which makes the claims in ROCKS true, makes the causal claim 
about Billy and his rock false. As such, the causal structure of the situ-
ation is not captured by a theory that belies this speaker judgment—a 
judgment that can only serve as evidence about causation if words like 
‘cause’ refer to elements of causal structure. To assume that words so 
refer is just to accept the troubled externalist hypothesis (ε).
Importantly Conceptual Analysis is not of a kind with a natural-
istic approach to language. As Chomsky (1965) describes the related 
methodology for linguistic inquiry, subjects’ judgments of the accept-
ability of a sentence need to be captured by a theory of grammar, with 
the hypothesis being that the acceptability of those judgments is ex-
plained by violations of grammatical rules. This makes sense if the ex-
planandum is an aspect of the human mind/brain, since the judgments 
of natural language speakers are (hypothesized by the Chomskyan to 
be) the product of a mental faculty which includes algorithmic rules 
for constructing sentence—a grammar. Analogous inquiry in semantics 
tends to pertain to judgments about entailment, the felicity of a series 
of descriptions to a scene, or judgments about whether expression pairs 
have similar meanings. What linguists do not do is introspect into the 
meaning of words in a language, and certainly not with an eye toward 
answering ontological questions. Such a methodology plainly makes 
little sense if one’s goal is to describe anything other than the way 
a particular subject views the world. Only with the added externalist 
42 Importantly Lewis takes cases like this to illuminate the nature of causation, 
not the semantics for the English expression ‘cause’, as exhibited by the judgments of 
competent English-speakers (Lewis 1973). He addresses this question in a footnote, 
indicating that his proposal regards causal facts, not linguistic objects. Further, 
Collins et. al. echo this goal in their introductory contribution to a prominent volume 
on the metaphysics of causation. In fact, they indicate that the central misstep of a 
competing analysis defended by Davidson (1967a) is the focus on sentences instead 
of propositions (Collins et al. 2004: 17). They insist that the evidence brought to bear 
by dissecting cases, in the manner above, informs us about propositions and causal 
facts, not merely linguistic expressions that invoke the term ‘cause’.
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assumption that the meanings of expressions have real-world denota-
tional meanings could such a methodology sensibly be applied for doing 
metaphysics. But it is precisely that externalist assumption that I’ve 
argued is problematic.
Nonetheless, debates about mental content (Burge 1975, 1979), the 
ontology of minds (Clark & Chalmers 1998), persons (Parfi t 1984), cau-
sation (Lewis 1973; Collins et al. 2004), identity (Black 1952), modal-
ity (Plantinga 2003), rationality (Williams 1979), moral theory (Foot 
1967), and many others require that natural language intuitions play 
a profound evidential role in settling ontological questions. But if natu-
ral language meanings fail to determine the truth-conditions for the 
expressions they serve, then the ontological commitments of speak-
ers that endorse those expressions as true are (at best) indeterminate. 
Conceptual Analysis is grounded on the presumption that the truth-
value judgments of competent speakers of a natural language in which 
the proposed thought experiment is written have ontological commit-
ments. The Realist retreat to scientifi c languages acknowledges the de-
fi ciencies of natural languages for this purpose. Such a Realist, in the 
absence of an adequate response to the worries presented here regard-
ing (ε ), should abandon Conceptual Analysis as a method of ontological 
investigation.
The arguments presented do not rule out the Realist’s methodol-
ogy full stop. A Realist might well respond to these worries by aban-
doning their use of natural languages for languages more amenable to 
externalist treatment. In particular, they might adopt the suggestion 
made by Quine (1960: 221) and defended by Sider (2011), and look to 
the invented languages used to express scientifi c theories—languag-
es constructed to avoid the pitfalls of natural language.43 That is, the 
Realist might contend that while the meanings of natural language 
expressions do not determine their referents, terms in a scientifi c lan-
guage do, insofar as such languages do not suffer from the vagueness 
and fl exibility of natural language expressions.44 For this Realist, the 
privileged language of ontology (LO ) is a formal language, developed to 
express our best scientifi c theories. However, given both the natural-
istic commitments of the Realist, and the fl exibility natural languages 
exhibit, the arguments presented here suggest that LO  cannot be a nat-
ural language, or some regimented variant of one. Consequently, the 
metaphysical methodologies that assume the externalist hypothesis for 
natural languages, like Conceptual Analysis, are without foundation, 
and should be abandoned as means of settling ontological disputes.
43 Hence the meaning at the heart of Quine’s proclamation “Language is conceived 
in sin and science is its redemption” (Quine 1973: 68)
44 Though this contention too might seem dubious when one considers the various 
uses of biological terms like ‘gene’ (Weber 2005; Beurton et al. 2000; Stotz & Griffi ths 
2004; Stotz et al. 2004; Wilson et al. 2007).
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